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Chuaigh Ár Lá1 – Debt of A Gaelsman: 
Ireland’s Sovereign Debt Crisis, 




Abstract: How did a small island nation on the periphery of Europe go from the 
pauper of the European Union, to a paragon of a market economy, and back to 
fiscal ruin within the space of twenty years?   
 
Ireland was the poorest nation in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1988.  In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s it undertook structural reforms to 
fundamentally reshape its economy, the result was a booming economy 
throughout the mid-to-late 1990’s and early 2000’s, primarily fueled by exports 
and foreign direct investment.  Rather than continue on a sustained, but slower, 
growth path in the 2000’s, the Irish went on a credit binge that inflated domestic 
property prices to dizzying highs and resulted in a financial hangover, the likes 
of which had never been seen before in the Republic.     
 
This credit bubble went unchecked by regulators and, in fact, was actively 
encouraged by successive governments.  Although asset bubbles may be 
inevitable, Ireland could avoid future fiscal crises by running a more counter-
cyclical tax policy and adopting a rules-based approach to banking regulation.  
From a Europe-wide perspective, the EU should put teeth into enforcing 
compliance with the fiscal spirit of Stability and Growth Pact and should create 
an independent regulator to monitor systemic risk in European Union (EU) 
financial institutions to ensure that kinds of problems that arose in Ireland do 








1 Translates to “our day has passed.” 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis, precipitated by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, has drastically altered the short-to-
medium term economic prospects of most European nations, if not all 
developed economies.  However, for several nations on the periphery of the 
European economic landscape, the crisis has exposed startling shortcomings 
in their public finances.  The most severely affected of these countries are 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS).
2
 
Of the European countries in such dire fiscal straits, Ireland is perhaps 
both the most surprising and the most expected example of an economy in 
distress.  Ireland’s situation is surprising because of the unprecedented 
growth its economy experienced from the mid-nineties until 2007.
3
  The 
Irish economy’s fall from grace was predictable for much the same reason 
as the United States’ economy; it had become overheated and overly reliant 




2 Martin de Sa’Pinto, Hedge Funds to Favor BRIC not PIIGS in 2010: Lipper, REUTERS, 
Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/15/us-hedge-research-idUSTRE60E2 
OJ20100115. 
3 The Irish Economy, ECON. AND SOC. RES. INST., http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
4 Jim Landers, Drowning in Debt: Ireland Faces a Tough Road to Economic Recovery, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/ 
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This Comment contends that although Ireland’s economic downturn 
was inevitable, its fiscal crisis was, and continues to be, greatly exacerbated 
by ineffective regulation of the banking sector at the national level and poor 
supervision of Ireland’s fiscal state at the European Union (EU) level. 
As a relatively small economy on the edge of Europe, Ireland will 
always be exposed to the economic shocks of larger nations, particularly the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  However, this is not to say that 
Ireland cannot mitigate the effects of future external economic crises and at 
least ensure that its fiscal plights are not the result of domestically created 
problems.  With the proper regulatory structure in place and a conservative 
approach to banking regulation, Ireland can and should be able to weather 
future economic storms. 
This Comment first traces the development of Ireland’s economy since 
its accession to the EU in Section II and the causes of the recent fiscal crisis 
in Section III.  The Comment will then shift its attention to the Irish 
government’s response to the crisis in Section IV.  Finally, in Section V, the 
Comment suggests measures for the Irish government to implement to head 
off future fiscal trouble and potential EU-wide coordination of banking 
regulation. 
A.  Background and Overview of the Effect of the Financial Crisis On 
Ireland 
Since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, Ireland’s fiscal 
situation has deteriorated dramatically.  By December 2010, the national 
debt soared to €93.4 billion ($129.6 billion),5 a 24% increase from 2009.6  
By then end of September 2011, this figure had increased to €114.7 billion 
($159.1 billion).
7
  Likely as a reaction to the country’s poor fiscal health, 
the yield on its 10-year bonds reached a record high of 8.7% on November 
10, 2010.
8
  This yield was 6.2 percentage points above the yield on German 
Bunds.
9
  Although the Irish debt management agency raised €20 billion 
($27.7 billion) from the bond markets prior to the yield spike and funded its 
short-term obligations, the high yields made it unfeasible to finance long-
 
20100925-Drowning-in-Debt-Ireland-faces-3711.ece. 
5 Conversions are based on exchange rate of one Euro for 1.3867 US Dollars as of 
October 14, 2011 (10:52 a.m.). 
6 Nat’l Treasury Mgmt Agency (Ireland), General Government Debt, http://ntma.ie/ 
GovernmentDebt/historicalData.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
7 Nat’l Treasury Mgmt Agency (Ireland), Government Debt, http://www.ntma.ie/ 
GovernmentDebt/GovernmentDebt.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
8 David Oakley et. al, Irish Bond Yields Surge to Record, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a6f23d0-eca9-11df-88eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1hgEWa5qr. 
9 Editorial, Still Crazy After All These Yields, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11th, 2010, 
www.economist.com/node/17465261. 
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  As of November 14, 2010, Bloomberg reported that Germany 
was pressuring Ireland to avail itself of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), a newly created fund to provide for troubled European 
economies, in order to quell market volatility.
11
  Ireland later acceded to 
external pressure and accepted an emergency credit line totaling €85 billion 
($111 billion) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.
12
 
As a result of these developments, it is unclear how much actual 
control Ireland will have in shaping its own financial regulations and 
determining its own fiscal policy in the future.  The terms of the EU-IMF 
loan require that Ireland meet strict quarterly targets set by the EU-IMF to 
reduce its budget deficit.
13
  Further, Ireland will have to consult the EU-
IMF before making any fiscal policy decisions that are “not consistent with 
the agreement.”14  Because of this uncertainty in the short term, this 
Comment will not focus on the immediate changes Ireland could make to 
improve its public finances and short-to-medium term growth.  Rather, it 
will focus on long-term measures to head off future fiscal crises, like the 
one Ireland is currently experiencing. 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRISH ECONOMY PRECEDING THE 
CRASH 
Prior to joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, 
Ireland was among the economic underperformers of Western Europe.
15
  
Much of Ireland’s underperformance prior to joining the EEC is attributable 
to protectionist policies pursued from the early 1930’s to the 1960’s as a 
means to build up domestic Irish industry in the wake of political separation 
with the UK.
16
  Most notable of these policies was the Control of 
 
10 Id. 
11 Dara Doyle & Simon Kennedy, Ireland Urged to Take Aid by Officials Amid Debt 
Crisis, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/cowen-
says-ireland-cooperating-with-eu-as-debt-crisis-threatens-region.html. 
12 David Labanyi, Ireland to receive €85 billion bailout at 5.8% interest rate, IRISH 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1128/ 
breaking1.htm. 
13 Stephen Collins et al., Memorandum sets out detailed conditions of EU-IMF loan deal, 
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1202/ 
1224284574676.html. 
14 Id. 
15 KLAUS REGLING & MAX WATSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SOURCES OF 
IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS 21 (2010), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie 
/Preliminary%20Report%20into%20Ireland%27s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%2
02010.pdf. 
16 Rory O’Donnell, Ireland’s Economic Transformation: Industrial Policy, European 
Integration and Social Partnership 4, (U. Pitt. Cen. West Eur. Stud., Working Paper No. 2, 
1998), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/27/ (noting that the Irish economy was deindustrialized 
in the 19th century); see generally Frank Geary, Deindustrialization in Ireland to 1851: 
Some Evidence from the Census, 51 ECON. HISTORY REV. 512 (1998), available at 





 passed in 1933 and enforced until 1957, which 
prohibited foreign ownership of Irish industry by requiring that 51% of the 
voting shares of manufacturing companies be held by Irish citizens.
18
  
These policies failed to encourage native industrial development and 
resulted in recession and emigration in the 1950’s.19 
Upon ascension to the EEC, Ireland was the poorest nation in the 
entire EEC group of countries.
20
  Economic stagnation continued through 
the 1980’s, a decade marked by high unemployment21 (reaching 17% in 
1986
22
), high levels of public debt (reaching 125% of GNP in 1987
23
), and 
mass emigration to the United States and the United Kingdom.
24
  As a 
country survey by The Economist magazine in 1988 rather harshly put it: 
Take a tiny, open ex-peasant economy.  Place it next door to a much 
larger one, from which it broke away with great bitterness barely a 
lifetime ago.  Infuse it with a passionate desire to enjoy the same 
lifestyle as its former masters but without the same industrial 
heritage or natural resources.  Inevitable result:  extravagance, 
frustration, debt [ . . . ] Ireland is easily the poorest country in rich 




This dismal trend continued until the early 1990s, when through a 
series of structural and taxation reforms made in the late 1980s, the 
economy underwent an unprecedented period of growth commonly referred 
to as the “Celtic Tiger.”26  A heavily protectionist economy transformed 
into a very open-market economy.
27
  Ireland’s GDP grew by an average of 
 
http://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0289.00103/pdf. 
17 Control of Manufactures Act 1932 (Act No. 21/1932) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1932/en/act/pub/0021/index.html. 
18 Antoin E. Murphy, The ‘Celtic Tiger’—An Analysis of Ireland’s Economic Growth 
Performance 7-8, (Eur. U. Inst., Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Stud., Working Paper 
No. 16, 2000), available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00_16.pdf. 
19 O’Donnell, supra note 16. 
20 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15. 
21 David McKittrick, More Migrants Quitting Ireland than any EU State, INDEPENDENT 
(UK), July 29, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/more-migrants-
quitting-ireland-than-any-eu-state-2038004.html. 
22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [IMF], World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the 
Recovery (Oct. 1, 2009), available at www.indexmundi.com/ireland/unemployment_ 
rate.html. 
23 Murphy, supra note 18, at 4. 
24 Id. 
25 Editorial, Poorest of the Rich, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1988, at 3. 
26 See generally Patrick Honohan & Brendan Walsh, Catching Up with the Leaders: The 
Irish Hare, 2002 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 28 (2002). 
27 See Peter Herrmann, Tíogar Ceilteach—An Enlargement Country of the 1970s as 
Showcase?, 38–40 (Eur. Soc. Org. Sci. Consultancy Inst. for Indep. Res., William Thompson 
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8.4% per annum between 1994 and 1999.
28
  Irish unemployment fell 
dramatically, from 16% in 1985 to below 5% in 2001.
29
 
Although the commentators are not in agreement as to the precise 
cause or causes of this growth miracle, most agree that structural labor and 
tax reforms were necessary preconditions for Ireland’s prosperity.30  Ireland 
became an attractive destination for foreign direct investment due to its 
English-speaking population, relatively low wages, educated workforce, 
and low corporate taxes.
31
  Social partnership helped maintain wage 
moderation in spite of a booming economy, as did an increase in the 
number of women entering the workplace.
32
  Also contributing to growth 
was a massive influx of EU money that funded, among other things, 
modernization of Ireland’s physical and technological infrastructure.33  
Development of infrastructure was essential in creating a framework upon 




As a result of this marked growth, the standard of living in Ireland 
improved, and by 2001, Irish workers’ incomes exceeded the EU average.  
The wage moderation of the 1990’s had seemingly been abandoned.35  This 
surge continued unabated as compensation per employee rose at two to 
three times the European average rate from 1997 to 2008.
36
  By 2007, Irish 
 
Working Papers 7), available at http://www.ucc.ie/en/socialpolicy/WilliamThompson 
WorkingPapers/. 
28 Murphy, supra note 18. 
29 Honohan & Walsh, supra note 26, at 28. 
30 Compare id. (arguing that Ireland’s growth miracle of the 1990s was largely the result 
of catching-up with the rest of Western Europe), with Oliver Blanchard & Barry Bosworth, 
Response, Comments and Discussion on Catching Up with the Leaders: The Irish Hare, 2002 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 57 (2002) (focusing on wage moderation while 
increasing productivity as the proximate cause of the growth miracle). 
31 See Irene Lynch Fannon, The Luck of the Irish or Just Plain Old Tax and Regulatory 
Planning? The Success of Venture Capital in Ireland, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 231, 
236-42 (2007). 
32 Lucio Baccaro & Marco Simoni, The Irish Social Partnership and the “Celtic Tiger” 
Phenomenon 5–7 (Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud., Discussion Paper No. 154, 2004), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dp15404.pdf. 
33 See THE WORLD BANK, RESHAPING ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 237 (2009).  Since its accession to the EU, Ireland has been a net recipient of EU 
funds amounting to €62 billion ($86 billion) between 1973 and 2009.  Pat Gallagher, 
Balance of Payments Still in Ireland’s Favour, IRISH EXAMINER, Jul. 27, 2009, 
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2009/07/27/story97318.asp. 
34 See CEM GALIP ÖZENEN, DEP’T OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERV. (TURKEY), THE EFFECT 
OF STRUCTURAL FUNDS ON IRELAND’S DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS FOR TURKEY 19–22 
(2006), available at http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/ozenencg/irlanda.pdf. 
35 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15 (commenting that while the economy operated at 
full employment, the focus shifted from keeping wages competitive to increasing wages to 
reflect economic growth). 
36 Id.  at 22 (noting that prior to 1996 compensation for Irish employees grew in line with 
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wages were the second highest in the EU after Luxembourg.
37
  Wage 
inflation drastically decreased Ireland’s competitiveness and deterred 
investment in exporting industries.
38
  Further, massive wage increases in the 
public sector would later severely undermine government finances by 
keeping public expenditures high in spite of a drastic fall-off in tax 
revenues due to the recession.
39
  The problem of high wages for government 
employees persists even after several rounds of cuts since 2008.
40
 
The EU’s influence constitutes almost as important a factor as 
domestic reform in shaping Ireland’s economy prior to the recent crash.  
Ireland has long been a supporter of moves toward increasing European 
market integration.
41
  It was entirely unsurprising that Ireland chose to join 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998 and that Ireland adopted the 
Euro as its currency in 1999.
42
  With the introduction of the Euro, Irish 
debtors and banks were able to borrow at comparatively lower interest rates 




other EU countries but that after 1997 Irish employees’ compensation grew faster than the 
EU average and that after 2002 in particular this rate of growth increased dramatically). 
37 Id. 
38 Carol Newman, Lost Competitiveness Must Be Tackled, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at 
5. 
39 Parmy Olson, Ireland: Fiscal Situation Bad But Not IMF-Bad, FORBES, Jan. 1, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/15/ireland-imf-update-markets-econ-
cx_po_0115markets06.html. 
40 Ann-Marie Walsh, Public Sector Wages Fall 4% but Pay Still Beats Private Sector, 
IRISH INDEPENDENT, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.independent.ie/national-news/public-wages-
drop-4pc-but-pay-still-beats-private-sector-2390351.html. 
41 This is not to say that Ireland has not had any reservations about greater European 
integration, most notably the initial rejection by referendum of the Nice and Lisbon treaties.  
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Rejection by Ireland Fails to Modify Nice Treaty, THE 
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jun. 12, 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1308884/ 
Rejection-by-Ireland-fails-to-modify-Nice-Treaty.html; Sarah Lyall and Stephen Castle, 
Ireland Derails A Bid to Recast Europe’s Rules, NY TIMES, Jun. 14, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/europe/14ireland.html?pagewanted=all.  
Ireland’s Constitution, unlike most EU member nations, requires a national referendum 
whenever significant changes are made to existing EU treaties.  Crotty v. An Taoiseach, 
[1987] I.R. 713 (Ir.).  Irish concerns are motivated chiefly by a fear of losing its staunch 
neutrality in the international arena.  See Henry McDonald, Lisbon Treaty Hangs in Balance 
as Ireland Votes, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2009/oct/02/lisbon-treaty-ireland-votes-eu. 
42 See Amity Stauffer, What is the European Monetary Union?,THE UNIV. OF IOWA CTR. 
FOR INT’L FIN. AND DEV., http://ebook.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/faqs/what-is-the-european-
monetary-union (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). The move to join the EMU was not solely 
economic, there was (and is) a strong political desire in Ireland to reduce trade dependence 
on the UK and strengthen cultural and economic ties with trading partners in continental 
Europe.  See Jim Power, The Debate is Good but is it Too Late?, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, 
at 45. 
43 Sebastian Dellepiane Avellaneda & Niamh Hardiman, European Economic Crisis: 
Ireland in Comparative Perspective 5, (September 2, 2010) (Univ. Coll. Dublin, UCD Geary 
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As a prerequisite to joining the EMU, member states must pledge to 
adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
44
  The SGP is designed to 
ensure that member states maintain budgetary discipline after the 
introduction of the Euro.
45
  The SGP requires member countries to run 
current account deficits of no more than 3% of GDP and total public debt 
levels of a maximum of 60% GDP.
46
  In spite of its disastrous fiscal 
situation, Ireland managed to stay within the bounds set by the SGP until 
2008.
47
  Moreover, Ireland no longer controls its own monetary policy, as 
this power was ceded to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt 
when it adopted the Euro.
48
 
Although Ireland appeared to be the picture of economic health 
throughout the 2000s, all was not what it seemed.  Years of budget 
surpluses masked deep structural problems in the budget.
49
  Moreover, 
expansion of bank asset sheets and record profits hid lax regulatory 
oversight, poor corporate governance, and reckless lending.
50
  Lehman 
Brothers’s collapse ostensibly precipitated the financial crisis, however 
Ireland’s economic condition was actually a house of cards vulnerable to 
any gust of wind. 
III.  CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN IRELAND 
Ireland, like almost all market economies, was deeply affected by the 
near total collapse of financial systems after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008.  Even though Irish banks did not themselves 
 
Inst. Discussion Paper Series), available at www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/working 
papers/gearywp201046.pdf. 
44 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. 
(C236). 
45 See Paulo Vila Maior, The Stability and Growth Pact: Enforceable, Flexible or Dead? 
2–3 (UACES 33d Annual Conference and 8th Research Conference, ‘The European Union: 
The First Ten Years, the Next Ten Years?’, Univ. of Newcastle, Sept. 2003), available at 
https://bdigital.ufp.pt/dspace/handle/10284/1417 (noting that the creation of the SGP was 
primarily motivated by German concerns that countries joining the EMU would behave well, 
fiscally speaking, in order to gain accession to the Euro but would revert back to profligate 
spending once accession was secured). 
46 Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 3. 
47 Jim O’Leary, External Surveillance of Irish Fiscal Policy During the Boom, (Nat’l 
Univ. of Ireland, Maynooth, Dep’t of Econ., Fin. & Accounting, Working Paper Series 
N210-10, 2010), available at http://eprints.nuim.ie/1991/1/N210-10.pdf (noting that in the 
five years prior to the financial crisis Ireland was running an average budget surplus of 1.3% 
of GDP).  In 2008 Ireland ran a deficit of €13.2 billion ($18.3 billion) or 7.3% of GDP and 
fell outside the limits set by the SGP.  BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS, DEPT. OF 
FINANCE, (2011) (IR.), available at www.finance.gov.ie/documents/guidelines/BES 
Sept2011.pdf. 
48 Stauffer, supra note 42. 
49 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 25–26. 
50 Id. at 19. 
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hold toxic assets, they were heavily exposed to global money markets and 
thus very vulnerable to the liquidity shocks that resulted from Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.
51
  This exposure to the global marketplace, which was a 
contributing factor to growth during the period of rapid economic 
expansion in the late 1990’s and 2000’s, became an acute vulnerability 
during the financial crisis.  Ireland boasted a very high trade-to-GDP ratio 
immediately prior to the financial crisis,
52
 with a particularly heavy reliance 
on foreign direct investment from the United States.
53
  As the United States 




 such as 
Ireland, suffered greatly.
56
  A modification of the old phrase “when the 
United States sneezes the world catches a cold” is appropriate here, except 
that instead of a cold, Ireland caught something akin to tuberculosis. 
Although the financial crisis emanated from the United States, it would 
be misguided to attribute the primary blame for the atrocious state of the 
public purse in Ireland on external factors.  That blame should be placed 
squarely on domestic actors, both public and private. 
A.  Failure of State Actors 
Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming of the Irish government of the 
past 10 years was a failure to responsibly manage budgetary surpluses 
during the period of rapid economic expansion.  Throughout the 2000’s, a 
series of Fianna Fáil-led
57
 coalitions simultaneously increased public 
expenditures and cut income taxes.
58
  By 2009, as a result of these policies, 
Ireland had among the lowest income tax burden of any Organization for 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) country.
59
  Public expenditure 
 
51 Id. at 16. 
52 Herrmann, supra note 27, at 39. 
53 Id. at 40. 
54 I am referring specifically to the liquidity crisis that resulted from the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
55 “Peripheral economy” is a proxy for those countries on the outer edges of the European 
Union (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that have undergone national debt crises 
since 2008.  Editorial, The Myth of the Periphery, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2010, at 59. 
56 Gregory Connor et al., The U.S. and Irish Credit Crises: Their Distinctive Differences 
and Common Features 4, (Irish Economy Note No. 10, Working Paper No. 10, 2010), 
available at http://www.irisheconomy.ie/Notes/IrishEconomyNote10.pdf (noting that with 
the seizure of the credit markets following Lehman’s collapse Irish banks were unable to 
refinance their large foreign borrowings and that this problem was compounded by the rapid 
deterioration of their domestic loan portfolios essentially bringing the entire Irish banking 
system to its knees). 
57 Fianna Fáil is a center-right Irish political party. 
58 O’Leary, supra note 47, at 5. 
59 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], TAXING 
WAGES 21 (2009). 
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grew faster than GDP every year from 2001 until the onset of the crisis.
60
  
In the 2007 budget alone, the government increased social welfare spending 
by €973 million ($1.35 billion) and cut taxes by €501 million ($695 
million).
61
  Not only did this combination of tax cuts and public spending 
increases leave the public fiscal health very susceptible to slowdowns in 
growth, but the Irish means of generating tax revenue also became more 
dependent on the business cycle.
62
 
Particularly problematic was the Irish government’s shift in tax policy 
from reliable sources of taxation, like income and excise duties, to an 





  “The share of these cyclical taxes reached thirty percent of 
tax revenue in 2006; in the late 1980s it had amounted to only eight 
percent.”65  Although surpluses appeared to be quite large, once adjusted to 
the business cycle these surpluses were in reality quite small.
66
  Others, 
including the IMF, estimate that instead of budgetary surpluses during 
2005, 2006, and 2007, Ireland actually had structural deficits of 5.4%, 
5.7%, and 8.7% respectively.
67
 
When a state’s revenue source is so heavily dependent on 
transactional-type taxes, it leaves the country’s fiscal situation in a very 
fragile state when fewer of the taxed transactions take place.
68
  Inevitably, 
fewer property-related transactions did take place once credit dried up 




60 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 25–27. 
61 Senan Hogan, Give-away Irish Budget Focuses on Families and First-time Home 
Buyers, IRISH NEWS, Dec. 7, 2006, at 12.  Particularly shortsighted was the government’s 
decision to double the mortgage interest deduction for first-time homebuyers, thereby 
perpetuating over-investment in the already inflated residential property market.  Id. 
62 Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 7–8. 
63 A stamp duty applies to “any instrument that is executed in the State or, wherever 
executed, relates to any property situated in the State or any matter or thing to be done in the 
State . . . .” Stamp Duties Consolidation Act 1999 (Act No.31/1999) §2(1)(b) (Ir.), available 
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0031/index.html.  This effectively means 
that a tax is levied whenever property is conveyed. 
64 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 26. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 25–27. 
67 See INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], IRELAND: 2009 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF 
REPORT; AND PUBLIC INFORMATION NOTICE ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION, 21–22 
(Jun. 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09195.pdf. 
68 Patrick Honohan, The Irish Banking Crisis Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 
2003–2008, 29 (unpublished report to the Minister of Finance from the Governor of the 
Central Bank), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Background.aspx. 
69 Revenues from stamp duties decreased from €1.65 billion ($2.29 billion) to €930 
million ($1.29 billion) from 2008 to 2009, a 43.7% drop.  DEP’T OF FINANCE (IR.), ANALYSIS 
OF TAXATION RECEIPTS (2009), available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/ 
exchequerstatements/2009/taxreceiptdec2009.pdf. 
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Ireland’s financial situation was completely unsustainable, and the worry 
about over-dependence on stamp duty as a means of revenue was borne out 
when those sources of revenue began decline dramatically in 2007.
70
 
B.  Over-Investment in the Property Market 
Ireland, like other Anglo-Saxon economies,
71
 has long fostered very 
high levels of home ownership; 75% of all Irish homes were owner-
occupied in 2007.
72
  It was precisely this inclination toward real estate 
investment that caused the collapse of the Irish economy.
73
  Before 2001, 
Irish economic growth was primarily driven by competitive wages and an 
influx of foreign direct investment.
74
  After 2001, as Ireland’s wages began 
to rapidly outpace GDP growth, its former competitive advantages eroded, 
and unsurprisingly foreign direct investment correspondingly declined.
75
  
During the period between 2001 and 2007, foreign direct investment in 
Ireland declined dramatically from just under 15% of Eurozone FDI in 2001 
to just over 5% in 2007.
76
 
During the period when foreign direct investment was falling deeply, 
the construction sector became an ever-increasing driver of growth in the 
Irish economy.
77
  By 2007, the construction sector made up 20% of total 
GDP
78
 and over 12% of the workforce.
79
  Throughout the 2000’s, Ireland 
experienced an asset bubble in property much like the one that occurred in 
the United States during the same time period.
80
  However, unlike banks in 
the United States, Irish banks did not invest in exotic financial instruments 
 
70 O’Leary, supra note 47, at 8. 
71 This term refers to English-speaking economies, whose variant of capitalism is typified 
by low taxes, minimal regulation and a weak social safety net.  This category is thought to 
include the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland.  Anglo-Saxon 
Capitalism, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t=Anglo_Saxon-capitalism 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
72 CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE (IRELAND), CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING IN IRELAND 2008 
EDITION, 67 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releases 
publications/documents/construction/current/constructhousing.pdf. 
73 See Morgan Kelly, The Irish Credit Bubble 1–2 (Univ. Coll. Dublin Ctr. for Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 32, 2009). 
74 Editorial, Ireland’s Economy, Threadbare, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2010, at 85. 
75 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 83 (2005) available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005_en.pdf (FDI into 
Ireland decreased from $26 billion to $9.1 billion between 2003 and 2004). 
76 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 9–12. 
77 Kelly, supra note 73, at 13 (noting that between 2001 and 2007, 28% of Irish GNP 
growth came directly from the construction sector). 
78 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 4. 
79 CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE (IRELAND), QUARTERLY NAT’L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
QUARTER 4 2007, at 7, available at http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/ 
documents/labourmarket/2007/qnhs_q42007.pdf. 
80 Kelly, supra note 73, at 11–12. 
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or engage in complex securitization of mortgage-backed securities, rather 
the problems lay in “plain vanilla property lending (especially to 
commercial real estate).”81 
The primary driver in inflating the Irish real estate market was the 
combination of low interest rates and the availability of personal credit.
82
  
This, in turn, was coupled with a tax deduction for mortgage interest and 
incentive schemes to the construction industry.
83
  As a result, house-price 
inflation ensued.
84
  Irish banks engaged in intensified lending in the real 
estate sector that contributed to the bubble.
85
  Often, banks abandoned their 
traditional conservative lending ethos in favor of increasingly risky loans.
86
  
This can be seen in the emergence in the mid-2000’s of loans with loan-to-
value ratios
87
 of up to and over 95%,
88
 which are in stark contrast to the 
average loan-to-value ratios of 60% in the mid-1990’s.89 
When it became clear that the Irish economy was overheating, raising 
interest rates might have been appropriate as a means to deal with the 
growing asset bubble in Irish real estate.
90
  However, this was impossible 
due to the centralization of control over monetary policy at the ECB, where 
concern was directed toward larger economies in the EMU that benefitted 
from low interest rates.
91
  Consequently, Ireland had to manage loss of 
 
81 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 29. 
82 Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 6. 
83 Honohan, supra note 68, at 30-31 (noting that by 2006 Ireland was one of only four 
OECD countries that permitted a mortgage interest deduction without a property tax). 
84 Jănis Malzubris, Ireland’s Housing Market: Bubble Trouble, 5 ECFIN Country Focus 
Issue 9, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1, 2), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
publications/publication13187_en.pdf (noting that between 1992 and 2006 new house prices 
increased by 300% in real terms and 340% in nominal terms). 
85 Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 6. 
86 Kelly, supra note 73, at 11–12. 
87 Loan-to-value ratio refers to the percentage of the property’s value that is mortgaged.  
The ratio is derived by dividing the amount of the mortgage by the value of the underlying 
property.  Joe Wallace, FHA Loans: What Does LTV Mean?, FHA NEWS AND VIEWS, 
http://www.fhanewsblog.com/2011/06/fha-loans-what-does-ltv-mean/ (last visited Dec. 26, 
2011).  High loan-to-value ratios are associated with a significant risk of default.  See 
generally, Brent Ambrose & Anthony B. Sanders, High LTV Loans and Credit Risk, 
http://www.uky.edu/~ambrose/Ambrose _Sanders_High_LTV.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 
2011). 
88 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 32–33. 
89 David Duffy, A Note on Measuring the Affordability of Homeownership, The Econ. 
and Soc. Research Inst. Quarterly Econ. Commentary, Jun. 26, 2004, at 71–72, 
http://www.esri.ie/news_events/press_releases_archive/2004/a_note_on_measuring_the_a/in
dex.xml. 
90 See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as A Crisis in the Rule of Law: 
From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 369, 379–81 (2009) (discussing the debating schools of thought on using monetary 
policy as a means of combating asset bubbles). 
91 Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 4–5. 
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exporting competitiveness through fiscal policy and wage-cost 
containment.
92
  Due to Ireland’s unusually weak formal rules governing its 
budgetary procedures,
93
 the Minister for Finance effectively had carte 
blanche when it came to crafting a budget.
94
  The series of ministers in 
charge of the Department of Finance, from 2001 until the crisis began, 
displayed no political will to dampen the rapidly overheating property 
market.
95
  Nothing exemplifies this more than the budgetary philosophy of 
Charlie McCreevy, Minister of Finance from 1997 until 2004, in his now 
infamous response when challenged on his large increases in public 
expenditures—”[w]hen I have it, I’ll spend it.”96 
C.  Impact of the Fall 
After reaching dizzying heights, property prices fell to earth with a 
thud.
97
  In 2007, property prices nationally declined by 7.3% and by an 
additional 9.1% in 2008.
98
  Prices fell in commuter counties of Dublin by 
16.8%.
99
  The fall in property prices heavily impacted Irish banks, whose 
domestic loan portfolios constituted as much as 61.2% of their balance 
sheets.
100
  Shares of Anglo Irish Bank, at one time the nation’s third largest 
lender, were trading at €18 ($25) per share in May 2008.  Eighteen months 
later, they were trading at 1% of that value.
101
  Unsurprisingly, Anglo Irish 
Bank was very exposed to the commercial property and construction 
 
92 Id. at 6. 
93 Philip Lane, A New Fiscal Framework for Ireland 12–17 (Inst. for Int’l Integration 
Studies, Discussion Paper No. 315, 2010), available at http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/ 
documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp315.pdf (noting that Ireland has very few rules guiding the 
Minister for Finance’s fiscal decisions, e.g, limits on expenditure growth or budget balance, 
and that Ireland’s fiscal process is not checked by an independent fiscal agency). 
94 Id. 
95 Sarah Carey, Ireland Spent the Money—Now It’s Time to Pay, THE TELEGRAPH 
(LONDON), Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5121005/Ireland-spent-the-
money-now-its-time-to-pay.html. 
96 Id. 
97 To get a flavor of the effect of the boom, and then bust, in the property market, a home 
in Churchtown, Dublin was sold in 1997 for €700,000 ($970,000), in 2006 for €10.5 million 
($14.6 million), and in 2010 was in receivership with an asking price of €3 million ($4.2 
million).  Edel Morgan, Fortunes of D14 House, from Boom to Bust, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/property/2010/1118/1224283610270.html. 
98 PERMANENT tsb/ESRI HOUSE PRICE INDEX 1996-2011, THE ECON. & SOC. RESEARCH 
INST., http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/permanent_tsbesri_house_p/ (last visited Dec. 26, 
2011) (follow link to spreadsheet above contact information). 
99 Id. 
100 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 34 (showing figure representing percentage 
shares of total outstanding credit for the construction (5.2%), residential mortgage (34.8%) 
and real estate activity sectors (21.2%)). 
101 Caroline Crawford, Anglo Irish Shares Plummet to New Low of 15 Cent, EVENING 
HERALD (IRELAND), Dec. 24, 2008, http://www.herald.ie/news/anglo-irish-shares-plummet-
to-new-low-of-15-cent-1584982.html (last visited March 3, 2012). 
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As a result of the violent bursting of this asset bubble, Ireland’s 
economy has suffered immensely.  Ireland’s GDP, which grew every year 
since 1993,
103
 declined by 3.5% in 2008 and is expected to contract by 
approximately 13.5% from 2008 through 2010.
104
  Any growth on the 
horizon is likely to be painfully slow.  GDP in 2011 is only forecasted to 
increase by just over 1.0%.
105
  Inextricably linked to this acute contraction 
of GDP has been the unemployment rate.  The unemployment rate has 
skyrocketed from 5.6% at the end of the second quarter of 2008 to 14.2% at 
the end of the second quarter of 2011.
106
 
To go along with these dismal economic events has been the great 
human toll that the crisis has taken in Ireland.  Emigration, a relic thought 
to be relegated to the history books, has returned to Ireland.  Thirty-five 
thousand people left the country from January to April 2010 alone and a net 
100,000 people are expected to leave the state by April 2012.
107
  For a 
country of approximately 4.2 million,
108
 this volume of emigration has a 
profound impact, both economically and emotionally.  Economically, the 
 
102 REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 32. 
103 GDP Growth (Annual %) Data/Graph: Ireland, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/IE?display=graph 
(last visited December 26, 2011). 
104 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 5.  To get a concrete idea of this decline, it 
is estimated that average household wealth in Ireland has decreased by €100,000 ($138,000) 
since the end of 2008.  Cliff Taylor, Household Wealth Down €140k Since Peak, THE 
SUNDAY BUS. POST ONLINE (Ireland), Sept. 4, 2011, http://www.sbpost.ie/news/ 
ireland/household-wealth-down-140k-since-peak-58467.html. 
105 Brian O’Mahoney, Ernst & Young Cuts 2011 GDP Growth Forecast by 1.7%, IRISH 
EXAMINER, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/ernst-young-cuts-2011-
gdp-growth-forecast-by-17-135954.html. 




107 Colm Heatley, Irish Emigration is Forecast to Accelerate, Exceeding Worst Years of 
1980s, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-20/irish-
emigration-is-forecast-to-accelerate-exceeding-worst-years-of-1980s.html.  Although many 
of the emigrants are not Irish nationals, but rather non-national immigrants who are leaving 
the country, since 2010 the majority of emigrants have been Irish nationals.  CENT. 




108 CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE (IRELAND), POPULATION 1901-2006, available at 
http://www.cso.ie/Quicktables/GetQuickTables.aspx?FileName=CNA13.asp&TableName=P
opulation+1901+-+2006&StatisticalProduct=DB_CN. 
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loss of the young, educated workforce impacts economic recovery.
109
  
Emotionally, it brings up the history of Irish emigration
110
 that is strongly 
linked with “national shame.”111  Moreover, the Irish landscape is littered 
with over 2000 “ghost estates”—completed or partially completed planned 
residential estates that are mostly vacant—that serve as a very visual 
reminder of the country’s recent economic past.112 
IV.  THE IRISH RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
After the financial crisis hit in September 2008, Ireland, like most 
countries, acted quickly in an effort to stem further losses in a rapidly 
deteriorating situation.  On October 2, 2008, the government raised deposit 
protection up to €100,000 ($139,000) to shore up market confidence in Irish 
banks.
113
  Many of the measures undertaken by the government were 
adopted in haste and without the usual deliberation that attends massive 
changes in public spending and banking regulation because of the extreme 
stress placed on financial markets.
114
  It may be unfair to judge these 
measures in the harsh light of day because of the conditions under which 
they were made; however an assessment must be made of what the 
government has done to date in order to make provisions for the future.  As 
the expression goes, if we do not understand history then we are doomed to 
repeat it. 
A.  Bank Guarantees and Implementation of NAMA 
In a drastic move to shore up confidence in the banking sector, the 
Irish Government moved to guarantee all depositors in Irish banks in 
2008.
115
  The assets covered by this guarantee amounted to approximately 
 
109 Although the data is preliminary, persons aged 15–24 make up almost half of Irish 
emigrants since 2008.  CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE (IRELAND), POPULATION AND MIGRATION 
ESTIMATES APRIL 2011 at 6, available at http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releases 
publications/documents/population/current/Population%20and%20Migration%20Estimates
%20April%202011.pdf. 
110 Guy Chazan, Irish Remedy for Hard Times: Leaving, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2011, at 
A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038039045761524 
22920009948.html (noting that emigration is to the Irish as inflation is to the Germans—an 
historic economic trauma that is fixed in the national psyche). 
111Editorial, Ireland’s Crash - After the Race, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2011, http://www. 
economist.com/node/18176072. 
112 Olivia Kelly, Building Slowdown Stalls Attempt to Complete 2,000 ‘Ghost’ Estates, 
IRISH TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/1014/ 
1224305756663.html. 
113 Killian Kehoe, Ireland—Responses to the Financial Crisis, 2009 EUR. ST. AID L. Q. 
126, 126-27 (2009). 
114 Id. 
115 Neil Shah et al., Ireland, France Aid Banks, As Jitters Go Global, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2008, at A1. 
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€365 billion ($506 billion), several times the country’s GDP.116  This 
measure was designed to help ease Irish banks’ immediate short-term 
liquidity concerns stemming from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
117
  
In spite of the government’s explicit backing, market confidence in the 
banking sector continued to deteriorate throughout 2008.
118
  In December 
2008, as losses continued to mount, the government agreed to inject €5.5 
billion ($7.6 billion) into Ireland’s three largest banks, Bank of Ireland, 
Allied Irish Bank and Anglo Irish Bank.
119
  In return for this capital 
infusion, the state took a 25% stake in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish 
Bank and a 75% controlling interest in Anglo Irish Bank.
120
  In January 
2009, the government outlined plans to nationalize Anglo Irish Bank, a 
particularly reckless commercial lender that was dubbed the “world’s worst 




In an effort to clean up banks’ balance sheets and reorganize the 
financial sector, the Irish government passed legislation to create the 
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in April 2009.
123
  NAMA 
was designed to restructure the banking sector by buying up bad debt from 
six Irish financial institutions in exchange for Irish government bonds.
124
  
The Agency is authorized to buy property-development assets with a book 
value of up to €90 billion ($124.8 billion).125 
Criticism for the plan has come from many quarters, including Joseph 
Stieglitz, prominent economist and Nobel Prize winner, who argues that 
NAMA squanders taxpayers’ money by substantially overpaying for 
essentially worthless loans.
126
  Underlying Stieglitz’s criticism is the 
 
116 Honohan, supra note 68, at 19. 
117 Id. 
118 Niamh Brennan, Reputation of Ireland Inc is Under Spotlight After Resignations, 
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at 19. 
119 Review of the Year, SUNDAY BUSINESS POST (IR.), Dec. 28, 2008. 
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121 Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2011, at 174, 
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-
201103 (quoting Theo Phanos, a British hedge fund manager with interests in Ireland). 
122 Colm Keena & Harry Magee, Government Nationalises ‘Fragile’ Anglo Irish Bank, 
THE IRISH TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at 1. 
123 National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, (Act No. 34/2009)(Ir.), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/eAct/2009/a3409.pdf. 
124 Frank McDonald, Bad Debt Agency May Be Scaffold for Property Developers, THE 
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at 6.  The plan is quite similar to the original concept of the U.S. 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was initially conceived of as a means to remove toxic 
securities from U.S. banks’ balance sheets.  See Editorial, The Tale of TARP, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 3, 2010, at A18. 
125 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 16. 
126 Louisa Fahy & Simone Meier, Government ‘Squandering’ Money in Bank Bailout 
Plan, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Oct. 7, 2009, http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/ 
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difficult question of how to price these property-related assets for which 
there is not a liquid market.  If NAMA overpays for the assets it will be at 
substantial cost to taxpayers.  However, if the NAMA aggressively 
negotiates down the value of these assets banks may become insolvent once 
again, thereby undermining the purpose of the entire endeavor, namely, to 
ensure the soundness of bank balance sheets.
127
  Even after NAMA had 
started buying up the “bad assets” from Irish banks, losses at these 
institutions have been larger than initially anticipated and the government 
may have to inject yet more capital directly into these banks.
128
  In 2010, 
Anglo Irish Bank recorded a pretax loss of €17.6 billion ($24 billion)—the 
largest corporate loss in Irish history.
129
  Alan Dukes, a former minister for 
finance and current chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, claims that total losses in 
the Irish financial sector may amount to over €100 billion ($139 billion) 
and require an additional €50 billion ($69.5 billion) injection of capital to 
insure a stable banking core.
130
 
B.  Austerity Measures 
After expending massive state resources into failing banks and with its 
public finances in serious decline, it was not entirely surprising that 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating from AAA to AA+ in 
April, 2009.
131
  Utilizing a government stimulus as a means to jumpstart 
economic growth became unfeasible with Ireland’s rising budget deficits.132  
As a result, the Irish government was forced to undertake severe cuts in the 
public sector wages and to institute tax increases as the sole means of 
bringing public finances back in order and convincing the market that it was 
serious about tackling its debt issues.
133
 
The government announced an emergency budget in April 2009, in 
 
government-lsquosquanderingrsquo-money-in-bank-bailout-plan-1906787.html. 
127 See Kelly, supra note 73, at 13–20. 
128 Editorial, The euro zone’s trouble spots: The bottomless bail-out; Ireland counts the 
rising cost of rescuing its banks, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2010, at 79, http://www. 
economist.com/node/17155947. 




131 Barry O’Halloran, ‘Credible Framework’ Needed to Tackle Crisis, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 
1, 2009, at 18.  Since April 2009 Standard & Poors has downgraded Ireland’s debt several 
times, and as of August 2011 S&P rated Irish debt at ‘BBB+/A-2’ or just above junk bond 
status.  S&P Affirms Ireland’s Rating, IRISHTIMES.COM, Aug. 5, 2011, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2011/0805/breaking18.html. 
132 Stephanie Flanders, When Fiscal Stimulus Isn’t Stimulating, STEPHANOMICS (Apr. 7, 
2009, 7:14 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/stephanieflanders/2009/04/ 
when_fiscal_stimulus_isnt_stim.html. 
133 Editorial, The Party is Definitely Over: How Wage Cuts and Tax Rises Might 
Preserve the Gains of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger Years, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009, at 51. 
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which it cut €1.8 billion ($2.5 billion) from the public budget and placed a 
7% levy on pensions and an income levy on all tax brackets.
134
  These 
measures were intensified in the year-end budget as public sector pay was 
cut by 5-8% for those making less than €125,000 ($173,000) and up to 15% 
for those making more than €125,000 ($173,000).135  These cuts were 
unilaterally imposed on public sector workers without consultation with 
public sector trade unions.  Unsurprisingly, these cuts were met with harsh 
criticism from trade unions that threatened widespread industrial action as a 
result of the proposed cuts.
136
 
The government, working in conjunction with trade union groups, 
eventually achieved a compromise in the “Croke Park Agreement,” with the 
government offering assurances that there would be no more pay cuts in 
return for active implementation of public sector reform measures.
137
  
Although an agreement was eventually reached, it is clear that the long-
standing “Social Partnership”138 agreements between trade unions, business 
leaders, and the Irish government had collapsed.
139
  In spite of industrial 
strife, and in contrast to other European nations facing similar painful cuts 
and tax increases, Ireland did not experience large-scale violent protests like 
those seen in Greece in 2010.
140
 
V.  SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE IRELAND’S LONG-
TERM FISCAL HEALTH 
Ireland is in a dire fiscal condition, and there are no easy answers to 
remedy its current balance sheet problems and its issues with raising capital 
from the bond markets.  Many of the immediate issues will likely be 
addressed by an emergency loan from the EFSF, the IMF, or some 
combination of the two. 
Some commentators, most vocally David McWilliams, an Irish 
economist and social critic, have suggested that the best approach for 
Ireland to take would be to leave the EMU and return to floating its 
 
134 Ireland Unveils Emergency Budget, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/7986862.stm. 
135 Editorial, Ireland’s Budget: Hard Times, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2009, at 58. 
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138 Begun in the mid-1980s, “Social Partnership” was a series of tripartite agreements 
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of INOU in Social Partnership, THE IRISH NAT. ORG. OF THE UNEMPLOYED, http://www. 
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  McWilliams’ posits that if Ireland dropped the 
Euro, it would be able to devalue its own currency.
142
  These commentators 
contend that once its currency is devalued in relation to the currencies of its 




This is certainly a drastic measure, and whatever its purported 
economic benefits, it would be very difficult to push through the political 
process.  Any attempt to leave the EMU would likely require a national 
referendum, and thus require a majority of public support.
144
  However, 
even after rejecting the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008,
145
 the Irish public still had 
the second most positive view of the EU of all member states.
146
  Ireland’s 
abandonment of the EMU would be detrimental to the country’s long-term 
economic health because it would risk marginalizing the country within 
Europe.  Also, the debt that Ireland currently owes to external creditors is 
denominated in Euros.  Thus, even if Ireland were to leave the EMU and 
devalue its own currency in an effort to kindle growth, the servicing of its 
Euro debt would become tremendously more expensive.
147
 
Leaving the Euro would likely harm Ireland’s long-standing 
relationships with its European trading partners and weaken Ireland’s 
 
141 See David McWilliams, Should We Divorce the Euro?, THE DAILY BUSINESS POST, 
Jan. 10, 2010, http://www.sbpost.ie/commentandanalysis/should-we-divorce-the-euro-
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competitive than Germany as an exporter, something that Ireland could not achieve).  Note 
also that Ireland sends the majority of its exports, not to other Euro countries, but to the UK, 
the US, and the rest of the world.  CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE (IRELAND), Main Trading 
Partners 2010, available at http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/externaltrade/maintradingpartners-
2010m/. 
142 McWilliams, supra note 141. 
143 Id. 
144 See Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713 (Ir.). 
145 See Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2011, 10:42AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6901353.stm (The Treaty of Lisbon is an amending treaty 
to the pre-existing EC treaties designed to streamline EU institutions after the ascension of 
10 additional members in 2004); see also, Editorial, Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Second 
Time Lucky?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14573513 (arguing 
that Ireland rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, due to concerns that the treaty could 
impinge Irish sovereignty on issues such as neutrality, internal taxation rates, and abortion; 
as well as Ireland’s own proportional representation in EU institutions under the proposed 
Treaty). 
146 Colm Kelpie, Ireland’s EU Love Affair Feels Strain; Survey, MIRROR (IRELAND), Feb. 
18, 2009, at 14.  Even though the Irish public’s view of the EU remains favorable, there has 
been a marked uptick in the percentage of people who hold a negative view of the EU and its 
benefit to Ireland since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Id. 
147 Bagehot’s Notebook, Tin-eared Tories, ECONOMIST, (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2010/11/euro_crisis. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:365 (2012) 
384 
already shaky political standing in the EU.
148
  Furthermore, there is a 
possibility that if Ireland leaves the Euro, other countries may follow.
149
  
Taking this line of reasoning to its logical extreme, it is possible that the 
entire Eurozone would collapse.  This would wreak untold havoc on 
financial markets and could have a disastrously destabilizing effect on the 
global economy, potentially driving the world back into recession.  This 
may seem improbable, but if we have learned anything from the turmoil in 
the financial markets in the past few years, it is to expect the unexpected 
and plan for the worst accordingly. 
Changes in banking regulation and a major overhaul in tax policy are 
two areas where the Irish government can lessen the risk of future domestic 
crises.  This, by itself, is not enough to ensure the future economic health of 
the EMU member states or the viability of the Euro itself.  The EU should 
create a supranational structure designed to assess systemic risk and provide 
for checks when those risks arise.  Moreover, integrated into this institution 
should be a mechanism to provide lines of credit for fiscally distressed 
member states. 
A.  Regulatory Reform of Banking 
As pointed out above, Irish banks were at the heart and center of the 
crisis in Ireland.
150
  It would be utterly fruitless to attempt to undertake any 
other reform measures without first addressing banking regulation.  At least 
some of the failure of the Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland (CBFSAI), the regulator responsible for overseeing financial 
institutions in Ireland, can be attributed to its dual mandate as regulator and 
promoter of the financial services industry in Ireland.
151
  This dual role 
creates an inherent conflict of interest between ensuring that financial 
institutions are fundamentally sound, and shying away from attracting 
negative attention to the financial industry.  A recent report commissioned 
by the Minister of Finance summarizes this awkward situation by pointing 
out that “[b]anks and building societies were seen as important institutions 
deserving appropriate respect and threats of action by the FR [Financial 
Regulator] in the absence of compliance were not typically part of the 
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A key part of this compliance problem is the system of banking 
regulation that the CBFSAI operated under, namely the “principles-based” 
approach.
 153
  The potential for reckless abuse and the risks of regulatory 
capture would have been lessened had the CBFSAI been operating the less 
flexible “rules-based” system.  Under the principles-based system, a 
regulator announces certain broad-based principles, which financial 
institutions must adhere to.
154
  This is contrasted with a “rules-based” 
system where detailed rules set out clearly what must be done and what will 
happen in the event that rules are not followed.
155
  These systems have their 
own individual merits and drawbacks.  The principles-based approach gives 
more flexibility to regulators about when to pursue enforcement, and it 
encourages financial institutions and regulators to work to achieve a 
particular result.
156
  The advantage under the rules-based approach is 
precisely the opposite of the principles-based approach.  It removes 
discretion from a regulator to decide when rules have been breached and 
lessens the degree to which regulators and financial institutions work 
collaboratively.
157
  The rules-based approach is appropriate when there is a 
fear that regulators will not diligently enforce stated principles. 
The principles-based approach is entirely dependent on voluntary 
enforcement by the regulator, which works well when that institution 
creates a reputation for stringent enforcement of the stated principles.  
However, when such a vigilant approach is lacking, as it was in the 
CBFSAI, it signals to financial institutions that they have free reign to 
proceed as they wish, irrespective of the stated principles.  Part of this 
laxness may be attributable to the familiarity between regulators and senior 
executives at financial institutions and a desire to avoid inflicting 
embarrassment on one’s acquaintances, which may be inevitable given 
Ireland’s size.158 
Due to the harm caused by this coziness between regulators and bank 
executives, it seems that a move to a more rules-based system would be the 
best approach to banking regulation in the future.  If the discretion to 
enforce proper banking practice and discourage risky lending is removed 
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from the regulator’s control, those rules are more likely to be followed and 
enforced.  Although there are drawbacks to a rule-based system, namely, 
that industries subject to the system expend substantial resources attempting 
to evade the rules,
159
 the alternative is worse.  Furthermore, the dual 
mandate of the CBFSAI should be eliminated, as there is an inherent 
conflict in responsibility to promote an industry and enforce regulations 
upon that same industry.  If there is to be a state-sponsored champion for 
promotion of the Irish financial sector, this responsibility should be placed 
in a totally separate development agency, such as the Irish Industrial 
Development Authority or a wholly new independent agency created 
specifically for this purpose.  As noted above, the alternative is what Ireland 
has seen in the last two years, where the close ties between the political and 
business elites ensure that banks do not fear regulators and take on a 
disproportionate amount of risk. 
Although this comment will not go into detail as to the types of rules 
Ireland should enact, there is a broad consensus that requiring banks to 
maintain a high capital reserve-to-loan ratio encourages a more 
conservative lending ethos.
160
  However, in order for such a requirement to 
be truly effective, it will be necessary to coordinate an EU-wide measure to 
raise capital reserves.  If the measure is not EU-wide then there is a risk that 
banks will relocate to other European states to take advantage of looser 
capital requirements.  Furthermore, having higher capital requirements in 
relation to other European states may discourage increasing competition for 
banking services in Ireland. 
B.  Readjustment of Tax Code in Favor of Counter-cyclical Revenue 
Sources 
One of the primary reasons Ireland’s fiscal health changed from large 
surpluses to extreme deficits so quickly is that the Irish government relied 
too heavily on cyclical revenue sources, stamp duties in particular.
161
  When 
those property transactions dried up, so did tax revenue.  The state needs to 
shift its revenue base from a pro-business cycle approach to one that 
provides a more consistent source of revenue.  An annually levied property 
tax would have the dual benefit of providing a dependable stream of tax 
revenue and dissuading future over-investment in property.  Although such 
a move would undoubtedly be very unpopular with the Irish public, 
desperate times call for necessary measures.  The Government can use the 
crisis as an opportunity to implement drastic changes.  To quote Rahm 
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Emmanuel, “[n]ever allow a crisis go to waste.”162  When the economy 
eventually improves, the impetus to impose such a tax will likely evaporate. 
Along similar lines, the existing mortgage interest deduction should be 
gradually phased out.  Like the absence of a property tax, this deduction 
distorts the market by providing incentives to invest in property over other 
types of investment.  The deduction also raises a horizontal fairness 
question, namely, why should the state subsidize homeowners over 
similarly situated groups like renters?  Moreover, the deduction, like 
deductions generally, disproportionately benefits wealthier individuals.
163
 
C.  Creation of an EU Institution Responsible for Systemic Risk 
Throughout much of the sovereign debt crisis that has ravaged Europe 
since 2008, the EU has been notable not for its action but for its inactive 
and reactive approach.
164
  The Euro was set up to centralize control of 
interest rates in the ECB, but the EMU left fiscal policy to the member 
states.
165
  As a result, there was no supranational means of providing credit 
to struggling member states that were in extreme fiscal distress.  This 
became very clear when Greece had to be bailed out in the spring of 
2010.
166
  The EU did eventually act, however its policies on the sovereign 
debt crisis were made on an ad hoc basis.
167
 
At its inception, the SGP only provided for a small range of policy 
measures to deal with member states’ fiscal deficits.168  Most of these 
measures did not apply to Ireland, however.  In the years immediately 
preceding the crisis, Ireland’s fiscal situation fell squarely within the 
constraints set by SGP.  However, a probing analysis would have revealed 
that public finances were on shaky economic ground.  As a result, Ireland’s 
dangerous financial condition continued unchecked by the EU because it 
followed the letter of law—deficits within 3% of GDP169—even though it 
ignored the spirit of the law by making public finances particularly 
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Even the policies that the EU could implement to ward off fiscal 
irresponsibility were seldom used prior to 2008 even though member states 
like France and Germany routinely ran deficits in those years.
171
  The 
effectiveness of these “punishments” from the EU is unclear, given that 
violations of the SGP are ignored by Germany and France.
172
  As the Irish 
parliamentary committee on European affairs noted: 
By late 2003 it became clear that their deficits were continuing to 
rise and that neither France nor Germany would meet their targets.  
Neither Member State faced sanction due to this non-compliance.  
These cases pointed to obvious credibility and enforcement problems 
for the SGP.  If the two largest euro area economies fail to comply 
with the rules then why should smaller countries do so?
173
 
All this points to necessary changes in the enforcement of the SGP.  
When the EU decided that it wanted to create a single currency for Europe, 
it is clear that it did not envisage member states becoming insolvent.  As a 
result, it did not provide measures to prevent or deal with a worst-case 
scenario, like a member state’s severe fiscal crisis requiring a bailout by the 
EU.  Such measures could have prevented or at least mitigated the effects of 
the recent crisis. 
The role of enforcing the SGP is currently held by the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN),
174
 a subgroup of the Council of the 
European Union.  The Council is made up of ministers of finance from the 
twenty-seven member states.
175
  ECOFIN is the wrong entity to be 
responsible for imposing sanctions for violations of the SGP due its 
inherently political composition.  As politicians, the ministers are unlikely 
to advocate for harsh sanctions or politically unpopular changes to other 
nations’ public finance.  The EU should create an independent regulator 
responsible for enforcing the SGP and monitoring systemic risk among 
European financial institutions.  This power could be rolled into the existing 
functions of the ECB, much like the Federal Reserve is set to become the 
regulator for systemic risk in the United States.
176
  The ECB possesses 
experience and knowledge of international finance that make it the 
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appropriate body to perform such a function. 
As an ancillary function, this institution should also provide credit to 
member states that are undergoing severe fiscal stress.  The advantage of 
having a permanent emergency credit institution is that the Eurozone will 
not run into the problems that it experienced with the Greek bailout.  Such 
an institution could set conditions precedent to accessing credit and attach 
previously agreed-upon terms to accessing states.  This would provide a 
more orderly and timely means to provide credit in emergency situations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If we have learned anything from the financial crisis that precipitated 
the Great Recession, it is that markets and policy makers have short 
memories.  To counter this effect, proper institutional structures ought to be 
put into place to correct for irrational exuberance of the type witnessed in 
Ireland in the past decade.  Ireland is an example of the disastrous 
consequences that may follow if corrections are not made.  Although mass 
emigration may be a problem specific to Ireland, budget deficits, banking 
crises, and unsustainable public debt loads are not exclusive to Ireland. 
Further, the EU needs to implement changes to its structure and 
enforcement of the SPG in order to provide for substantive preventive 
measures to avoid fiscal disaster by member states.  It also needs to provide 
credit for member states in the event of budgetary crises.  The current 
system is too political, as it ignores the discrepancies’ of larger member 
states and enforces sanctions in an uneven and unpredictable manner.  It 
makes much more sense for the role of surveyor of member states’ fiscal 
health to be occupied by an essentially apolitical body, like the ECB. 
Ireland’s recent travails present a learning opportunity for the global 
economy, especially emerging markets.  Since its emergence in the mid-
1990s, economists and policy makers have touted Ireland’s economic 
model as a paragon of development and as a template for other small 
developing nations.  Ireland is no longer the poster-child for developing 
nations; however, there is a risk of throwing the baby out with the bath 
water by focusing solely on Ireland’s recent fiscal crisis.  The past twenty 
years of Ireland’s economic history can be broken down into two distinct 
phases:  the late 1980s until approximately 2001, and from 2001 or so 
onward.  The former phase represented real and sustained economic 
development based on fundamentally sound principles, whereas the latter 
stage was an attempt to continue rapid economic growth, even though most 
of the gains from structural economic reform had already been realized.  
The result should have been sustained, albeit slower, growth; however what 
emerged was a reckless property boom and bust. 
In spite of its current position, Ireland still has better economic 
prospects than other debt-riddled EU countries like Greece and Portugal, 
precisely because of investments in the education of its populace and the 
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reforms undertaken in the first phase of the Celtic Tiger.  In that sense, 
Ireland’s rise and subsequent fall presents a more complete picture of 
economic development and a cautionary tale to policy makers in similarly 
situated nations. 
 
